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Arbitration of Fraud in the
Inducement of a Contract
RiHCARD K. PARSELL*
The Arbitration Law of New York provides that an agreement
to arbitrate either an existing or future controversy is "valid, en-
forcible and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract"' and provision is made for
compelling a recalcitrant party to proceed according to his contract.
It is also provided that a party, before being compelled to arbitrate,
be given the opportunity to have it summarily determined whether
he has in fact agreed to arbitrate the question sought to be submitted
to arbitration.2 A recent case has come before the Appellate Division
in New York which calls upon the court to decide whether an issue
of fraud in the inducement of a contract is a matter for arbitration
and whether it is a matter which must be decided by the court before
arbitration can be compelled according to the New York statute.
If a party can have such an issue of fraud tried by the court before
*A graduate of the Cornell Law School engaged under the direction of the law
faculty, in a study of Commercial Arbitration for the American Arbitration
Association.
1L. 1920, ch. 275. § 2. "Validity of arbitration agreements. A provision in a
written contract to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising between
the parties to the contract, or a submission hereafter entered into of an existing
controversy to arbitration pursuant to title eight of chapter seventeen of the code
of civil procedure, or article eighty-three of the civil practice act, shall be valid,
enforcible and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity forthe revocation of any contract."
2 J3, "Remedy in case of defaut. A party aggrieved by the failure, neglect or
refusal of another to perform under a contract or submission providing for arbi-
tration, described in section two hereof, may petition the supreme court, or a
judge thereof, for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner
provided for in such ontractorsubmission. Eight days' notice in writing of such
appication shali be served upon the party in default. Service thereof shall be made
in the manner provided by law for personal service of a summons. The court, or
ajudge thereof, shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making
of the contract or submission or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue,
the court, or the judge thereof, hearing such application, shall make an order
directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the
contract or submission. If the making of the contract or submission or the
default be in issue, the court, or the judge thereof, shall proceed summarily to
the trial thereof. If no jury trial be demanded by either party, the court, or
the judge thereof, shall hear and determine such issue. Where such an issue is
raised, any party may, on or before the return day of the notice of application,
demand a jury trial of such issue, and if such demand be made, the court, or
the judge thereof, shall make an order referring the issue or issues to a jury in the
manner provided by law for referring to a jury issues in an equity action. If
the jury find that no written contract providing for arbitration was made or
submission entered into, as the case may be, or that there is no default, the pro-
ceeding shall be dismissed. If the jury find that a written contract providing for
arbitration was made or submission was entered into and there is a default in
the performance thereof, the court, or the judge thereof, shall make an order
summarily directing the parties to the contract or submission to proceed with
the arbitration in accordance with the terms thereof.
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being compelled to arbitrate, it offers ready means for delaying the
proceedings and, therefore, to a certain extent enables the original
purpose of expeditious settlement to be thwarted by one of the parties.
The case referred to is Matter of Cheney Brothers v. Joroco Dresses,
Inc., 218 App. Div. 652, 219 N. Y. Supp. 96 (ist Dept. 1926). An
examination of the facts3 shows that plaintiff sold some textiles to
defendant under a contract containing a general arbitration clause
and providing that the plaintiff would not sell the pattern selected
to any other person. A dispute arose under the contract and plaintiff
demanded arbitration. Defendant declined to proceed and there-
upon plaintiff moved for an order compelling arbitration. Defendant
then answered that the contract had been obtained by fraud and
misrepresentation in that the salesman had not intended to and
actually did not restrict the patterns to him. Upon reaching the
Appellate Division the court, reversing the order of the Supreme
Court, said, "that the question as to whether or not the contract
was fraudulently induced raises an issue of fact which must be tried
before the right to arbitration under the contract may be enforced.
If the contract was voided by fraud, the arbitration provision therein
falls." Three of the judges dissented.
Before commenting upon the holding of the court from a legal
point of view, it may be well to examine various ways of dealing with
fraud from an hypothetical standpoint. For the purpose of discussion,
it is suggested that a contract containing a provision for arbitration
be regarded as divided into two parts, one a contract for sale or for
services or what not, which we shall call the first contract, and the
other, which we shall call the second, a contract to submit to arbi-
tration disputes as to the first contract.
Where fraud is alleged as to the second contract, i. e., the agreement
for arbitration, the possible means for determining the issue are to
have the question determined by the court before compulsion of
arbitration, to have the arbitrators decide the matter, or to have it
determined by the court after arbitration has been had and when it
is sought to have the award enforced. It seems obvious that the
validity of the agreement for arbitration should be determined before
arbitration is compelled both from the point of view of the provisions
in the Arbitration Law and from the point of fundamental justice.4
3The report does not state the facts of the case.
4In Matter of Gresham & Co., Ltd., 202 App. Div. 211, 195 N. Y. Supp. xo6
(ist Dept. 1922), it was held that the question whether there had been a valid
signing of an agreement by the agent who signed the contract was one for sum-
mary determination under sec. 3. Similarly in Matter of Palmer & Pierce, Inc.,
195 App. Div. 523, 186 N. Y. Supp. 369 (Ist Dept. 1921), summary determi-
nation as to whether the arbitration agreement had been in fact made was held
demandable prior to arbitration.
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And further, as a practical matter, a party could well be deemed to
waive questions of fraud of this type by not raising them at that
time.
Where fraud is alleged as to the first contract, the contract to which
the arbitration provision is appended, the same propositions may be
put, i. e., whether the point should be determined by the court before
arbitration is compelled, whether it should be settled by the arbi-
trators, or whether it should be determined after the arbitration when
it is sought to have the award enforced. In this case, the answer is
not so entirely obvious and requires somewhat detailed consideration.
In the Cheney Brothers case, the fraud was in the inducement
of what we have called the first contract. (There was no fraud
alleged as to the second.) The view of the Appellate Division was
that the allegation of fraud, if made out, would invalidate the whole
contract including the arbitration provision and on that ground the
court decided that fraud as to the first portion of the contract had
to be determined by the court before arbitration could be compelled
under section 3 of the Arbitration Law. This decision seems con-
vincing unless it can be shown that it is not necessary to consider a
contract containing a provision for arbitration as an entirety, but
that a contract containing an agreement for arbitration may be
regarded as severable and as composed of a first contract and a second
supplementary contract, somewhat as suggested above for discussion
purposes.' It becomes a question for consideration, therefore, to
determine which view is preferable, and so for the moment it may
be well to consider how such contracts have been regarded in dealing
with other matters.
At common law a general provision in a contract for arbitration
of disputes which might arise out of the contract in the future, is
considered invalid in the sense that it will not bar an action brought
on the principal contract.6 This shows at least that the provision
for arbitration is not considered so tied up with the rest of the pro-
visions of the contract as to permit its invalidity to affect the validity
of the rest of the contract. But a suit thus brought is usually held
5In ELLIOTT, CONTRACTS, (1913) § 3655, an agreement for arbitration in a
building contract is called a "supplementary contract."
6In United States Asphalt R. Co. v. Trinidad Lake P. Co., 222 Fed. ioo6(S. D. N. Y. 1915), there is an excellent discussion as to the various reasons
assigned for this rule and their lack of conviction, and as to the way the author-
ities are established in this country. For an exhaustive review of the change of
view of the English courts on this point and the precedent established in this
country, see JULIUs HENRY COHEN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW
(igi8).
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to constitute a revocation of the arbitration agreement7 and the fact
that disputes arising out of the principal contract were settled in
court, contrary to the agreement of the parties, may be made the
basis of an action for damages for breach of the contract to arbi-
trate.8 This seems to infer separateness in the treatment of the
arbitration provision.
Under the Arbitration Law, agreements to arbitrate are valid9
and can be made a bar to an action on the principal contract.10 Such
provision for arbitration has peculiar significance, for where there
is breach of contract, the arbitration provision is not subject to the
usual rules as to right to rescind, absolution from obligation to per-
form, etc. For example, if, in the Cheney Brothers case, the Joroco
Dresses, Inc., had merely sought to rescind the contract because
Cheney Brothers had broken it in not giving them exclusive patterns,
they would have been unable to rescind the arbitration agreement
and would not be considered absolved from their duty to arbitrate. -
This vitality again seems to indicate that an arbitration agreement
is regarded as distinct from the rest of the provisions of a contract
and as standing upon an independent footing.
An agreement for arbitration is governed by the laws of contract
and is in its nature a form of contract." A contract for arbitration
refers, of course, to some particular subject matter about which there
may be dispute, but it is equally clear that an arbitration contract
may be executed independently and that it may be in and of itself
a complete and distinct contract. The consideration for such an
independent contract consists in the mutual promises to abide by
the award. Where an agreement for arbitration is executed together
with and as part of another contract, it does not necessarily follow
that it loses its character as an independent agreement, for execution
as one instrument is not a test of singleness of contractual obligation.
Suppose the case where parties make the contract for arbitration
at a time subsequent to the making of the contract to which it refers.
In such case, its independent footing would seem quite clear, yet'as
a matter of fact there is little actual difference between that case and
7There is a good discussion of this point in Williams v. Branning Mfg. Co.,
153 N. C. 7, 68 S. E. 9o2 (I9IO), annotated in (1911) 31 L. R. A. (N. s.) 679.
For direct holdings on the point, see Paulsen v. Manske et al., 126 Ill. 72, 18 N. E.
275 (1888), and Crilly v. Philip Rinn Co.,-135 Ill. App. 198 (1907).8Call v. Hagar, 69 Me. 521 (1879); Miller v. The President of Junction Canal
Co., I N. Y. 98 (1869); Union Ins. Co. v. Central Trust Co., 157 N. Y. 633,
52 N. E. 671 (1899).
gSupra, note i.
10 § 5 of the Arbitration Law, L. 1920, ch. 275.
"District of Columbia v. Bailey, 171 U. S. I61, 43 L. Ed. 118, 18 Sup. Ct.
868 (1879).
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the case where the agreement is executed as part of one instrument. 12
It is not particularly helpful to consider the case where an agreement
for arbitration is appended to an illegal contract. In such case, the
arbitration agreement is ineffective. The ineffectiveness, however,
is not necessarily due to the fact that the arbitration clause shares
the illegality of the principal contract, but more probably is due to
the fact that an arbitration and award cannot create a valid obligation
out of something that is inherently illegal, even though the contract
for arbitration itself may be valid. And even though illegality be
the issue, an award as to it is not conclusive."
It may be well to distinguish at this point between a distinct
supplementary contract and a separable part of a divisible contract.
The term divisible contract as generally used refers to apportioned
contracts 4 Williston says, "A divisible contract, using that term
properly, is always one contract and not several contracts. It differs
in one respect only from other contracts-namely, that on perform-
ance on one side of each of its successive divisions, the other party
becomes indebted for the agreed price of the division."15 It is obvious
then that a contract containing an arbitration clause is not what is
technically called a divisible contract and it is, therefore, not helpful
to consider the law applicable to such contracts. There is one class
of divisible contract, however, that may be referred to argumenta-
tively, namely, where there is an agreement in restraint of trade
which is unreasonable in part and reasonable in part. Such a contract
is often upheld as to the reasonable part and only considered un-
enforcible as to the remainder.' 6 This might be the basis for arguing
that a contract which is voidable on account of fraud in inducing one
part of it, is unenforcible only as to the part concerning which the
fraudulent representations are madeYX
121n United States Asphalt R. Co. v. Trinidad Lake P. Co., supra note 6, one of
the provisions of a charter party was an ordinary agreement for arbitration and
the court in commenting upon it said at page 1007, "There can be no doubt but
that this was a submission to arbitration, and for that reason was a contract
between the parties to this action."
13 There is a detailed consideration of contracts to arbitrate illegal matters in
Benton v. Singleton, 114 Ga. 548, 40 S. E. 81r (igoi).
"Woodward, The Doctrine of Ditisible Contracts, (i9oo) 39 Amx. L. PEG. (N.s.) I.
152 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) 1648, § 861.
16Edgecomb v. Edminston, 153 N. E. 99 (Mass. 1926).
"
7 Further cases of somewhat similar effect, namely, that a contract bad in
part but separable will be enforced as to the valid part, the rule in such cases
being that where there is no imputation of mnalum in se the bad parts do not
affect the good, are Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, I Wall. 221 (U. S. 1863) and
Southwell v. Beazley, 5 Or. 458, (1875).
In Kahn v. Orenstein, 12 Del. Ch. 344, 114 At1. 165 (1921), there was specific
performance of part only of a divisible contract, the test for severability being
stated as separateness of consideration.
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In examining sections 2 and 3 of the Arbitration Law in order to
ascertain whether they are aimed at the entire contract in which an
arbitration agreement appears or whether they are aimed merely at
the agreement for arbitration, we find the language of section 2 to be,
"A provision in a written contract to settle by arbitration a con-
troversy thereafter arising between -the parties to the contract,
* * * shall be valid, enforcible and irrevocable, save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."1 8
Section 3 adopts this definition by referring to "a contract or sub-
mission providing for arbitration, described in section 2 hereof."
The scheme of the Arbitration Law seems to be to make a contractual
provision for arbitration valid and enforcible and to provide means
for compelling arbitration according to an agreement to arbitrate.
It is further the scheme of the act to give a party, before he is made
to arbitrate, means for obtaining the decision of the court on the
question whether he has in fact entered into a valid contract to
arbitrate the dispute sought to be arbitrated. In Matter of Bullard
v. Grace Co.19 the court says per Pound, J., "On such application
[under section 3], the other party may put in issue (a) the making
of the contract to arbitrate the questions sought to be submitted to
arbitration, or (b) the submission of such questions to arbitration,
or (c) the failure to comply therewith." The subject of specific
comment thus seems to be the arbitration agreement itself apart
from the remaining provisions of the contract. Whether questions
as to the validity of this agreement and as to its effect in binding a
party to arbitrate may in some cases be dependent upon questions
as to the validity of the contract to which it is appended, is not
mentioned. As has already been pointed out, the court in the Cheney
Brothers case said that it was so dependent. It has been the endeavor
of this comment to show that that result is not necessary and that
an agreement for arbitration may be considered as standing upon
a separate footing. Such suggested interpretation of the contract
not only does not seem out of line with the language and purpose
of the Arbitration Law but seems rather to be what the framers of
the act had in mind. Moreover, such a way of regarding arbitration
agreements conforms to the way courts have handled such agree-
ments in other matters and does not contravene the law in any way.
Another point that the Cheney Brothers case brings up is whether
questions as to fraud in the inducement of the first contract, namely,
the contract to which the arbitration agreement is appended, are
18Supra note i. Italics are writer's.
1924o N. Y. 388, 395, 148 N. E. 559 (1925).
ARBITRATION OF FRAUD
included within the scope of a general agreement for arbitration.
A contract for the arbitration of a particular matter essentially
involves a relinquishing of the right to have that matter tried in
court. The extent to which rights are relinquished depends upon
the contract. Thus parties may contract to have questions of law
as well as of fact tried by the court.20 They can even agree that
determination of the scope of matters included in the arbitration
agreement is for the arbitrators.2' Thus it would seem that parties
can agree to have matters such as fraud in the inducement of the
principal contract settled by arbitration. However, where there
is a general arbitration clause not expressly mentioning fraud, some
rule of construction for such a clause must be applied. In construing
a contract, attempt is made to ascertain the intent of the parties or,
if it is thought that the matter was not definitely considered by the
parties, attempt is made to determine what would have been their
probable intent if they had actually considered the question. A chief
purpose in agreeing for arbitration is to secure expeditious settlement
of a controversy between the parties. To have the question of fraud
settled by the arbitrators is more expeditious than to have the matter
tried by the court. So from this standpoint it would seem that, if
the parties had considered the matter, they would have decided to
have a controversy as to fraud settled by the arbitrators, the most
expeditious way. Moreover, suppose that after an agreement for
arbitration one of the parties refuses to go on with the contract to
which the arbitration agreement refers because he says that such
principal contract was induced by fraud, and the other denies the
fraud. In such case, it would not seem improbable that the parties
would consider the whole dispute between them as one for the arbi-
trators to decide.
It is hard to lay down a rule that can be applied uniformly because
the language of arbitration clauses varies. For example, a clause
to the effect that all questions as to the making and performance of
the contract be submitted to arbitration, would quite clearly indicate
that questions such as fraud are to be included within the scope of
the submission, whereas a clause merely referring to disputes arising
in the performance of the contract would not. In cases of ambiguity,
a rule of presumption must be applied, and, as indicating theproper
rule, the following general matters of policy may be considered,
namely, that statutes on arbitration are liberally construed, that
20Matter of Wilkins, 169 N. Y. 494, 62 N. E. 575 (1902).21See Piercy v. Young, 14 Ch. Div. 200 (1879).
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the courts favor arbitration as a means of settling disputes, and that
the law favors expedition in the settlement of controversies.?
Where the parties intend to have questions such as fraud arbitrated,
it is clear that arbitration of them can be compelled according to section
3 of the Arbitration Law. Ontheotherhand, whereit is evident that it
was not the intent of the parties to have fraud arbitrated, it is obvious
that they cannot be compelled to have that issue arbitrated. Where
it was not the intention of the parties to have fraud arbitrated but
where arbitration is demanded as to questions other than fraud, the
other party resisting arbitration because of fraud alleged in the
inducement of the principal contract, the procedure is not so obvious.
It is possible to argue that until the question of fraud as to the princi-
pal contract is determined there is doubt as to the existence of the
contract to which the arbitration agreement refers and that a party
has the right to have the doubt resolved by the court before he can
be compelled to arbitrate anything. On the other hand it may be
argued that it was the intention of the parties to have all controversies
which might arise on account of reliance on the contract, e. g., where
there is part performance, adjusted by arbitration whether the
principal contract was valid or not. Probably, however, in cases
where it cannot be said, even with benefit of presumption, that
questions of fraud in the inducement of the principal contract were
included within the scope of the arbitration agreement, it is more in
line with the probable intent of the parties to have such questions of
fraud determined prior to arbitration.
In summarizing these comments on matters raised by the Cheney
Brothers case, it is suggested as preferable to regard a contract con-
taining a provision for arbitration as consisting of a principal contract
and a supplementary contract for arbitration which stand upon
independent footings as far as questions-of validity are concerned and
it is further suggested as preferable to presume that matters such as
fraud in the inducement of the principal contract are embraced
within the scope of a general arbitration clause.22a In addition to
uWabash Ry. Co. v. American Refrigerator Transit Co., 7 Fed. (2d) 335,
350 (8th circuit 1925). MORSE, ARBITRATION AND AWARD, (1872) part I, ch.
2, p. 57.
'
2a That an issue of fraud in the inducement of the principal contract is em-
braced within the scope of a general arbitration agreement, see De Long v.
Stanton, 9 Johns. 38, 42 (1812), where the court said, "The submission in this
case was general, and embraced 'every demand and cause of action, in law or
equity.' No language could have been more comprehensive. If the allegation
of fraud, in the sale of the farm, was true in fact, it was a cause of action em-
braced by the submission. (I Salk. 211. I Lev. 102.) Parol evidence is not ad-
missible to limit the extent of the submission, and to show that it was to be
confined to matters actually in dispute or controversy; for this would be to con-
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what has been said heretofore, it may be added that if the decision
of the court in the Appellate Division is to stand, recalcitrant parties
will in many cases be enabled to circumvent the provisions of a good
arbitration agreement and also the purpose of the Arbitration Law
by trumping up sufficient allegations to give facts constituting
legitimate matter for arbitration the dressing of fraud in the induce-
ment of the principal contract, which, according to that decision,
would have to be decided by the court before any arbitration could
be had.
While the one question of fraud has been considered thus far, the
suggestions that have been made may be applied to other questions
of validity. Of course reference is only made to those matters affect-
ing the validity of what we have called the first or principal contract
and the distinction must always be borne in mind between such
matters and matters solely affecting the validity of the second
contract, namely, the contract for arbitration in itself, which latter
are obviously to be decided by a court before arbitration.2s
Questions of construction are somewhat analogous to questions
of validity in that they may be better handled by regarding a contract
containing a provision for arbitration as divided into a first contract
and a second supplementary agreement for arbitration. Matter of
Cheney Brothers v. Joroco Dresses, Inc., is an illustration of a case
calling for the construction of the supplementary agreement, the
particular point being whether or not it embraces the question of
fraud in the inducement of the principal contract. Where a party,
before arbitration raises a question as to the construction of the second
contract, it seems clear that he should be entitled to have it construed
by a court if it will affect the question whether he has agreed to
arbitrate the matter or not.24 In Matter of Palmer &. Pierce, Inc.,2
the phrase "arbitration in the usual manner" had to be construed
in order to determine whether the arbitration agreed upon was one
to be conducted by the board of arbitration of the Dried Fruit
Association of New York, or pursuant to the laws of New York and
tradict the bond. Nor can the defendant be admitted to show that there was
no such fraud as was alleged, for that would be to open the merits of the award,
and to try over again a matter which had been included in the submission and
the award. It was for the arbitrators to decide, secundum allegala el probata,
whether the charge of fraud was made out. Their decision upon the point was
final, according to the doctrine laid down in Barlow v. Todd."
2For example, Matter of Gresham & Co., Ltd., and Matter of Palmer & Pierce,
Inc., supra note 4.24Matter of Young v. Crescent Development Co., 24o N. Y. 244, 148 N. E.
510 (1925).
. 25195 App. Div. 523, 186 N. Y. Supp. 369 (1921).
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the court decided that such matter of construction was necessary
prior to granting an order.26
261n order that a discussion of questions of construction be complete it should
embrace questions regarding the construction both of the first contract and of
the second contract as those terms have been used in the above comment. Also
the procedure should be discussed where questions of construction are raised (i)
prior to arbitration, (2) at the arbitration hearings, or (3) after arbitration when
it is sought to have the award enforced.
We have seen in the concluding paragraph above, theresult where questions of
construction of the second contract are raised prior to arbitration. Where
questions as to the construction of the second contract are raised for the first time
at the hearings before the arbitrators, it seems that a party may put a stop to
the proceedings and that the arbitrator he has chosen may withdraw until there is
court determination as to the scope of the arbitration provision. Matter of
Bullard v. Grace Co., 240 N. Y. 388 (1925). Where such matter is raised for the
first time upon attempt to enforce the award it would seem that a party who has
been so dilatory should deserve little consideration. Where, however, arbitrators
place a construction upon the second agreement not subscribed to by the court,
the court does not consider the decision of the arbitrators as conclusive. Hal-
stead v. Seaman, 82 N. Y. 27, (188o).
Construction of the first or principal contract is sometimes demanded in
order that a party may know whether the dispute which he is called upon to
arbitrate arose out of that contract or not. In such case, if the question is raised
prior to arbitration, it would seem that a party should not be compelled to
proceed until the matter of construction is disposed of by the court. Matterof
Kelly, 240 N. Y. 74, 147 N. E. 363 (1925). Where the matter is raised for the
first time at the arbitration hearings, whether a party has the power to withdraw
or whether the arbitrator has authority to decide it, is a question that raises some
difficulty. There seems little objection, however, in allowing the arbitrator to
decide the question. What view the courts would take of the question when
brought up for the first time upon attempt to enforce the award is problematical.
Questions of construction of the principal contract which are involved in the
general question of liability under the contract would seem to be for the arbitra-
tors. Itoh & Co., Ltd., v. Boyer Oil Co., Inc., 198 App. Div. 881, 191 N.Y. Supp.
290 (ist Dept. 1921). Compare Hutcheson v. Eaton, 13 Q. B. D. 861 (1864),
where the court held that the arbitrators were without authority to determine
the existence of a trade custom which could be read into the contract. There
was dissent in that case. The case was followed, in Re North-Western Rubber Co.
(limited) and Huttenbach & Co., (19o8) 2 K. B. 907 where there was again
difference of judicial opinion. Both cases are discussed in 53 Sol. J. 158, "Effect
of an Award Based on the Exssence of a Trade Custom," where the holdings of
the court were criticized and the view of the dissent upheld as to law and prac-
ticability.
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